In this paper I approach trust law from the perspective of the European legal system considering whether or not to codify this area of the law. My hope is that this practical focus can bring some better understanding of the nature of trust law. I try moreover to move a step forward in tackling some of the basic questions that should be on the agenda of European private law today.
In this paper I approach trust law from the perspective of the European legal system considering whether or not to codify this area of the law. My hope is that this practical focus can bring some better understanding of the nature of trust law. I try moreover to move a step forward in tackling some of the basic questions that should be on the agenda of European private law today.
There is no need of much introduction on the question of Codification of the private law in Europe.
The issue has been now on the table for a while. Although there still is much disagreement among scholars on whether or not it is worth doing it as well as on how it should be done, the fact is that a number of projects are going ahead so that the whole discussion on the whether, the if, and the how might become obsolete and boring pretty soon 2 .
A better way to use scholarly energy seems to me that of learning by doing, being aware that the ultimate decision will be political and that as scholars the only responsibility we carry is that of producing technically decent building blocks for this enterprise.
In a previous paper I have argued that in the domain of contract law the European Civil Code should be limited to a number of mandatory provisions, common for consumers and merchants and enforced by an effective system of European Courts 3 . In this paper I approach trust, another area of private law that could be a good candidate for codification. Compared to the issue of codification of contract law, the law of trust immediately creates special problems. To begin with, none of the traditional paradigmatic civil law codes (Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland) includes a chapter on trust while all of them include contracts. Second, because the dispute on the nature of trust law itself is far from settled among scholars and the issue on whether trust is to be considered a matter of property or a matter of obligation is still loading the table of the scholarly discussion with useless conceptualism 4 . Third, because trust is itself a legal category lacking unitary meaning so that today its boundaries are certainly in need of more definition than those of contracts 5 .
Despite these difficulties, there are a few reasons that make trust law in a front running position to be considered for any project of European Codification. First, on the political ground, because trust is probably the most important contribution that common law countries are likely to offer to the whole codification enterprise. If the European Civil Code has to compromise between the different legal traditions of Europe, the inclusion of trust is likely to happen as a consideration paid to common lawyers for being involved in an enterprise that might have the stigma of being a biased civilian idea 6 . This political reason is by no means the only justification for giving thorough attention to trust in a codification project. Indeed, trust law has proved to be a very successful legal device. From its original crib in the English Chancery jurisdiction it has found its way in a very high number of other legal systems. Many jurisdictions in which today trust can be found are ignorant of the common law-equity division. Consequently, such legal systems have received trust at very different levels of their sources of law, sometimes placing it in the code, sometimes introducing special statutes, sometimes working out case law developments 7 . This variety shows 3 U. Mattei, Efficiency and Equal Protection in the New European Contract Law. Mandatory, Default and Enforcement Rules, in 39 Va. J. Int. Law 537 (1999) . 4 The issue has been framed exactly in these terms at the Bristol Conference of the International Academy of Comparative Law. See the some of the reports in M. Canton-Cumin, Trust. A Matter of Property or of Obligation (Forthcoming 1999) 5 See generally, A.J. Oakley (Ed.), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (1996) 6 See P. Le Grand, Against a European Civil Code 60 Mod. Law Rev. 44 (1997) 7 An updated panorama of statutory sources of trust law can be found in M. Luopoi, Trust. Legislative Sources (1998) that trust has proved to be a desirable legal arrangement. Some scholarship has tried to show that this prestige stems from a higher degree of institutional efficiency lacking in the so called "trust like devices" or "trust alternatives" that some civil law systems have worked out in order to resist importing a legal device felt as incompatible with the traditional civil law notion of property rights 8 .
Finally, trust law has strongly emerged from the ghetto of black letter comparative law and it has gained a central position in the high From the perspective of my involvement as a co-editor in this last project I delimit the scope of this paper's inquiry. As it is very well known, the development of trust in the common law tradition has affected a large variety of areas of the law so that there is virtually no topic of Anglo-American private law in which the law of trust does not or could not play some role. In the following pages I do not approach two broad areas of private law in which Anglo-American trust plays a fundamental role: family law and successions 12 . These two fields, connected as they are with each-other, are deeply imbedded in local cultural characteristics and indeed many scholars think that, because of this, there is no need to achieve any degree of uniformity in this domain. 835 (1980) this is not the area of highest interest for my purposes 14 . The domain of my discussion (as that of the common core project on trust) is therefore commercial or business trust, in the broad sense of trust as an institutional arrangement aimed to reduction of transaction costs (including agency and monitoring costs) in order to achieve efficiency in the development of a European common market.
The transactions that I am focusing on are those among capable adults interested in money investment or in other managerial services. I do not focus, therefore, on spendthrift trusts, trusts for the protection of the minors, incapable or unborn. Seen from this perspective ---that of individual capable of striking Coasian bargains in their self interest, one can focalize on the aspects that make trust a desirable market institution. It should then be possible to focus on the issue of how to reach desirable goals which are fully within the scope of the European treatises even before Maastricht.
The question is whether an how a European Civil Code can help in this attempt.
Section 2 sketches the fundamental aspect of institutional desirability of the trust as it has been developed in the common law world. Section 3 clarifies the fundamental questions that one should ask in this domain. Section 4 approaches some preliminary problems that might frustrate the codification enterprise. Section 5 briefly explains the Common Core Questionnaire on Trust seen as a preliminary inquiry on the state of trust law in Europe today. Section 6 concludes approaching the limits of substantive law codification.
2. The basic economic structure.
Seen as a fundamental market institution, trust shares some characters with contracts and some with property. From the first perspective, a recent seminal paper by Professor Langbein has pointed out that the nature of trust law, like that of contract, is mostly that of an aggregate of default rules aimed at gap filling in certain recurrent transactions, so that the parties, by using the label trust, can incorporate in their contracts a highly developed body of law mostly aimed at the specification of Consequently, the beneficiary might only recover damages ex post should the trustee irrational behavior ends affecting the value of the fund. Nevertheless he can not interfere, for example, with the risk taking attitude of the trustee should the instrument be phrased in a way to allow to the trustee full managerial powers. From the decision making perspective, the entitlement of the beneficiary is protected only by a liability rule and that the property right is vested in the trustee.
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The large transfer of decision making authority that the creation of a trust determines over the trust property can only be afforded by a legal system that grants significant and effective powers to the beneficiary. And indeed such a protection is another fundamental analogy between the structure of trust and that of property rights. J. 2091 (1997) interesting for a civil law observer 18 complete the analogy between the remedial devices of the owner (that can chase his property wherever he finds it) and the beneficiary. One could say that in front of the third parties the entitlement of the beneficiary is protected by a property rule. ---(1997) most significant difference between the common law trust and the civilian alternatives. Moreover the beneficiary has tremendous difficulties in tracing property that he does not own.
As we will see, this prima facie impression that can be grasped by reasoning with the categories of ownership and obligation might not be entirely accurate and it is certainly in need of being verified.
Nevertheless the institutional structure created by the "dual ownership" of the Anglo-American trust allows a plain division of labor between the trustee and the beneficiary that civilians find it different to reproduce.
Seen from the economic perspective, such division of labor is efficient. By granting proprietary protection to the beneficiary the law reduces agency costs. By granting proprietary powers to the trustee the law facilitates transfers to more efficient uses. In general, transaction costs are significantly reduced because the trustee can devote his resources on grasping business opportunities rather than on obtaining the consent of the beneficiary. The beneficiary will be able to devote his resources in his principal activity (e.g. teaching law or farming) rather than in trying to grasp himself business opportunities, an activity in which he is not specialized and where he would be better off by hiring a professional. Division of labor that follows from this efficient institutional arrangement is a crucial aspect of economic development 20 . We might conclude that the structure of Anglo-American trust law constitutes an advanced institutional arrangements that more developed societies should recognize.
The relevant questions
Given the fact that advanced economic development is shared by a number of civil law countries, one could wonder how such countries tackle these basic problems of labor division. work so that one should get rid at least of the most useless questions that are usually asked in the comparative law literature on trust.
As the work of Professor Langbein has taught, the contract aspects of trust law should be interpreted in the very same way of any other contractual arrangement 21 From the contractarian perspective the main aspect is gap filling and incorporation of a body of law as a system of default rules. The basic problem is then whether and if some rules should be considered mandatory (either because of paternalism or because of externalities problems) 22 . Hence, also in the prospective of Codification, the mandatory vs. default character remains crucial. Elsewhere I have argued that in the domain of contract the Code should be limited to mandatory rules 23 . If the focus is on contract aspects ( or if trust is to be approached as "a matter of obligation") as in the traditional comparative law jargon one would say, the relationship between the parties involved in the trust deal occupies the center of the stage. Such a relationship, of course, is not developed in a vacuum but it might affect third parties as it invariably happens when the parties contract among themselves for managerial services that, in business transactions, involve transfers of property rights. The question then becomes how the body of law that the parties incorporate in their deals takes care of third parties, how in other words it is possible to avoid externalities and instead to signal to third parties incentives to actively transact rather than to be unwillingly affected by externalities. This is the traditional function of property law, or at least, to use Professor Carole Rose's convincing The obligation vs. property issue is not only a misleading dichotomy. It might also preclude the correct appreciation of other possible institutional alternatives to trust. It is interesting to observe that while a lawyer from the civil law if asked to inform a colleague from a common law jurisdiction on "alternatives" to trust law available in his country would invariably spend a long time to explain the obsolete and largely useless notion of the "fiducia cum amico" he would invariably omit any discussion of corporations. This phenomenon, made clear by the prima facie replies to the trust questionnaire offered by leading experts in civil law jurisdictions in the Common Core Project, almost exactly parallels the one pointed out by Professor Langbein in another recent article, that on the "Secret life of Trust" 27 . Common lawyers nurture a vision of the importance of trust in a domain that is relatively trivial as compared to that in which this institution offers a really vital contribution. In the domain of business law, the area in which most of the stakes of European legal integration are at play, the relationship between trust and corporation as competitive alternatives needs to be tackled. This is an area in which possibly very substantial transaction costs might be saved by offering a simple legal form able to take care of both the needs of flexibility and those of notice that would be accomplished by the proper mix of contractual and property structure.
In conclusion, three seems to be the relevant questions to be asked: 1. Which of the rules that govern a trust transaction should be mandatory and which ones should be default. 2. Which parts of the trust deal can remain internal and which part should be known (at least in theory) to third parties. 3. Which legal structure is best to take care of the basic needs of a trust transaction, i.e. managerial discretion and beneficiary protection. Consequently, the European Civil Code should be strictly limited to mandatory provisions, that minimum amount of rules (or perhaps standards) that neither the parties nor the member states would be free to change. This is of course where the issue of legitimacy might arise so that the case for mandatory European rules should be found in the needs behind the making a common market.
Consequently such rules (or standards) should be justified by economic principles. Mandatory rules therefore must be codified for two possible reasons: a) to take care of the protection of the weaker party i.e. because of a paternalistic rationale or b) to take care of externalities i.e. to avoid that certain costs of the transacting amongst parties be transferred to innocent third parties 31 . Both these aspects deserve some discussion. As to the paternalistic rationale, nothing particular can be said in the domain of trust that one would not already say in that of contract. The only thing that one might stress here is that weakness in the domain of business trust usually does not stem from the personal status of either of the parties but rather from informational asymmetry between the investor (beneficiary) and the trustee (manager). Such asymmetry can simply be explained as a phenomenon of bounded rationality on the side of the investor and it might actually convey appropriate incentives for healthy division of labor 32 . The investor is simply too busy in his personal activity to bother getting all necessary information so that it might be rational for him to trust the trustee and the law as his agency of protection towards the professional trustee. His reliance is of course justified only if the legal system does not allow the professional trustee to add to that bunch of paper that the investor is signing without reading another little form that lowers all the standards of professional liability.
The second rationale for mandatory rules, that of avoiding externalities, is typical of trust as a property instrument on which third parties would rely. In this context there is a balance to strike between the interests of the investor beneficiary and that of the general creditors of the trustee that, if the trust nature of the fund is not properly signaled, might rely on the trust property as belonging to the trustee. Here again there is a case for precluding the trustee and the beneficiary to make their secret deals prevail on the interest of third parties (and perhaps even of the tax authority should not be exaggerated. To begin with, as we have seen, property is only one aspect of the trust structure. Considering trust as "property" is already a matter of interpretation: it means focusing on certain aspects and forgetting others. Second, and perhaps more important, the principle of "subsidiarity" allows a transaction cost reducing codification. If one can better obtain by mean of European instruments rather than of local law, the reduction of transaction costs that the structure of trust law allows, the aforementioned principle grants jurisdiction to the Union. National reporters picked among recognized experts in the field in their own legal systems 48 are encouraged not only to offer the prima facie answer that the average local lawyer would give to his client but also to focus on alternative business structures (such as corporations) that might be available to effectively solve these problems. It is of course important to know both the shared wisdom, the automatic, routine reply that a local lawyer would give to his client, and the amount of flexibility that each legal system allows for alternative solutions. Emphasis has been placed on taking into consideration all relevant sources of local law (statutory provisions and different 46 See H.Hansmann-U. Mattei cit supra note-- 47 The text of the convention can be conveniently read and compared with a variety of statutes devoted to trust in M. Lupoi, cit. supra interpretations) as well as European sources already in place. It is crucial that, the degree of effectiveness of any given source be briefly addressed too.
A very important part of the project, perhaps the most difficult, has been the drafting of fact situations reasonably unambiguous and interpreted in a similar way by lawyers belonging to different legal cultures (i.e. used to different professional routines). In this process the editors have relied on tentative answers produced by national reporters for a relatively large sample of member countries: Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Holland, Sweden and Portugal. Finalized versions of such national reports and reports for the other countries belonging to the E.U. are in preparation. In due course we should be able to know how European legal systems handle the fundamental problems that were introduced in the first part of this paper. At that point we might know what needs to be simply restated and what needs to be changed in order to create a transaction cost reducing chapter on trust for the European Civil Code. The question is very important despite its speculative outfit. Indeed it brings at the center of the stage one issue that has been recently pointed out in a brilliant paper by Professor Daniela Caruso:
"The Missing view of the Cathedral". 50 According to this account, today the lively process of European private law building is too much concerned with substantive "core" private law issues.
Insufficient attention is paid to deep divergence in the institutional structure, interpreted in the broadest possible meaning of "legal process". In other words, it might not be so much in the substantive rules of private law that the peculiarities of national legal systems resist to uniformity as much as in the legal process, including aspects such as access to justice, organization or disorganization of courts, structure of the legal profession and so on.
In the domain of trust law, the need to consider and adequately appreciate the impact of procedure over substance, is even more clear than elsewhere in the law. Not only the historical origin of trust is to be found in the dual set of courts, an accident of Anglo-American jurisprudence 51 . Many of the devices that characterize trust law ---tracing being the most important example ---can be seen as mere techniques of evidence law 52 , a branch itself lacking from the civil law. It is worth here to quote from a classic in the field of comparative law, the casebook of Professor R.B.Schlesinger:
"Our law provides for a comprehensive and exceedingly effective scheme of judicial supervision of every phase of trust administration. The Court has power to construe the trust instrument, to determine its validity, to give directions to the trustee, to make the trustee account, to approve Certainly however, while European substantive private law can live and even become relatively uniform only by means of interpretation, the same can not happen with the judicial process which needs an ad hoc political decision to be revamped. Perhaps the interest of trust as a contribution of common law countries to European private law codification must be appreciated as a pragmatic way to point out priorities. In the nineteenth century, the age of substantive law codification in the The results of this preliminary study on a chapter on Trust for a European Codification can be summarized as follows:
1. Codification might be a necessary but not sufficient tool to make available to all European countries the advantages of the common law institution of trust. A thorough rethinking on the role of the judiciary in making European private law might is highly advisable.
2. The essential aim of the trust chapter is: a) to reduce transaction costs by providing unimpaired proprietary decision making power to the trustee. b) to reduce agency costs by providing property rule protection for the beneficiary.
3. The chapter on trust of the European Code should be limited to mandatory rules. Default rules are better provided by private enterprises.
4. The chapter on trust should avoid changes into national legal systems that are not necessary to reach its essential aims. In particular, it should be carried on with full knowledge of institutional 55 General instructions on how to answer the Common Core Questionnaires can be read in appendix to Bussani-Mattei, cit. supra note---for a penetrating discussion, see O. Lando, The from Jacob an amount corresponding to the increased value of Greenacre. She claims that this increase is a wrongful gain from a transaction which created a conflict of interest and duty, since JacobAEs duty was to use the information he acquired in managing EstherAEs assets for her benefit and not for his own gain. Will Esther's claim succeed?
Alternative 2): Jacob owns Greenacre, another undeveloped piece of land in the same area, in his personal capacity. Jacob sells Blackacre to Bill, a member of the zoning board responsible for the planning of the district which includes both Blackacre and Greenacre.
The transaction is at market value. Six months after the sale, a change in the zoning ordinances (produced by the Board of which Bill is a member) increases the value of Would it make a difference if Tom were a practising lawyer?
Alternative 2): Tom is a travel agent. He sells to his customers tickets from various airlines.
The money paid by his customers for the tickets is deposited in a bank account in Tom's The facts are as in Q5, except as detailed below. The following alternatives occur:
Alternative 1): Without authority, Roberto uses all of the money in Simon's account (Euro1.000) to buy a painting. When Simon learns of this, the market value of the painting has risen to Euro2.000. Roberto is still solvent. Simon wants to terminate the relationship and take the painting. Can he?
Alternative 2): As in Alternative 1., but before Simon learns of the transaction, the painting is destroyed. It is insured for its market value. By the time Simon learns of this, Roberto has become personally insolvent. Simon wants to terminate the relationship and take the insurance claim. Can he?
Alternative 3): Without authority, Roberto uses all of the money in Simon's account (Euro 1.000), along with Euro1.000 of Roberto's own money, to buy a painting. By the time Simon learns of this, the market value of the painting has fallen to Euro1.000 and Roberto has become personally insolvent. Simon wants to terminate the relationship and take the painting. Can he?
Alternative 4): Roberto has an unsecured overdraft facility (revolving loan facility/line of credit) with his bank, in his personal capacity. He borrows Euro100.000 from this facility and uses it to buy a piece of land in his personal capacity. Later, without authority, he uses all of the money in Simon's account (Euro100.000) to pay the debt he owes to the bank. Litigation arises between them. Jane claims the invalidity of the trust provision of the arrangement, and claims that the relationship should be governed by local law. What is the result?
